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PROTECTION OF PRIVACY OF
COMPUTERIZED RECORDS IN THE
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER
After two New York State troopers stopped an automobile for speed-
ing, a routine inquiry on the vehicle's four occupants was made through a
New York State computer facility linked to an FBI computerized criminal
information system. The computer's quick response revealed that one of
the occupants was wanted by a midwestern police department on a weap-
ons violation. Prompted to investigate further, the troopers found that a
woman passenger possessed a revolver, a pistol, a knife, and a small
quantity of marijuana. Further search revealed an automatic machine gun
with hollow point bullets and three pounds of heroin, valued at $250,000,
in the vehicle's trunk. This episode is representative of numerous inci-
dents where the FBI's computerized criminal data system, the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC), has provided virtually instantaneous
information of unexpected value to a law enforcement agent.'
Since the 1920's, the FBI, under authority derived from the Justice
Department, has maintained files containing information about individuals
and has made most of thi; information available to authorized agencies
and institutions. 2 Over the years the number of records maintained con-
tinually increased, as did the number of information requests. This trend,
coupled with the increasingly interstate character of crime, forced the FBI
to turn from an operation dependent on manual records and mail delivery
to a system utilizing the scale and speed of modern data processing equip-
ment. At approximately the same time, automatic information processing
technology began to mature. 3 By the 1960's, the computer industry could
provide a databank system with centrally stored records that could be
accessed directly and swiftly through a network of computer terminals
manned by law enforcement agencies throughout the country.
In 1965, plans were announced for an integrated nationwide criminal
information network. After extensive testing, a pilot phase NCIC system
1 This episode appeared in the May, 1973, issue of the NCIC Newsletter, which is
published by the FBI and circulated among the state and local agencies participating
in the NCIC system. One or two similar episodes appear in each issue of the monthly
newsletter under the heading "Hits on the System".
2 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1970), the Attorney General is directed to
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identi-
fication, crime, and other records; and (2) exchange these records with,
and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Govern-
ment, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
Under 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1972), the Director of the FBI is authorized to execute these
powers under the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General.
3 An earlier attempt by the FBI to use calculating machines to solve its record-
keeping problems proved to be premature. In 1934, a punch-card system for searching
fingerprint records was installed, but later abandoned when the volume of prints re-
ceived grew beyond system capacity. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN
A FREE SOCIETY 51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY].
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went into operation in January, 1967. 4 Initially, only records of wanted
persons and stolen property were maintained. It was stated, however, that
additional criminal information might be added as the system took shape. 5
In 1968 and 1969, the stolen property files were expanded, and in Nov-
ember, 1971, a national computerized criminal history (NCCH)" file 7
was made operational.8 The current NCIC system maintains files on
wanted persons; stolen vehicles, including aircraft and snowmobiles; li-
cense plates, guns, and other identifiable articles; stolen securities; stolen
boats; and offenders' criminal histories." As of January, 1972, the system
network included terminals in numerous state and local law enforcement
agencies and in all FBI field offices, thus allowing on-line access by some
6,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada.' 0
The purpose of this article is to describe the social benefits and costs
of the NCIC and to indicate the need for a program of operational con-
trols to temper the system's impact on the balance between individual
privacy and law enforcement needs. Various approaches which could be
incorporated into a program of safeguards are introduced and briefly an-
alyzed. Finally, the article discusses several overall design issues which
should be considered in the construction of an adequate program of safe-
guards. Particular emphasis is placed on the NCCH file since it is the
major source of the tensions underlying the issues addressed.
I. SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE NCIC
A. Benefits
The NCIC, particularly the NCCH file, offers major benefits to several
groups. It has proven its usefulness to law enforcement agents by provid-
4 This pilot phase system linked together fifteen police jurisdictions and included
some 23,000 records on file. Id. at 52-53.
5 The statement was made by an FBI spokesman at the opening-day demonstration.
Id. at 53.
6 Although the FBI uses the acronym CCH to designate its national computerized
criminal history file, the acronym NCCH will be used hereinafter in order to avoid
confusion with the standard abbreviation of Commerce Clearing House.
7 The national criminal history file concept was developed by a project called
SEARCH (System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories) in-
itiated by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the Justice
Department. Although a representative of the FBI worked with the project during
at least part of its early months, eventual FBI control of the criminal history file
was not a part of the original plan. Control of the system could have been given to
a multistate consortium with one state office serving as a message-switching center.
Alternatively, the LEAA might have coordinated the system through a clearinghouse
administered by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Vesting control
in the FBI was another possibility. After intense behind-the-scenes lobbying, Attorney
Generall Mitchell transferred primary responsibility for managing the proposed sys-
tem from the LEAA to the FBI. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at
57-59.
8 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan., 1974, at 8.
9 Id.
10 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb., 1972, at 3-4.
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ing on-the-spot information concerning objects and persons, thus permit-
ting an investigating officer to exploit an opportunity that he otherwise
might not have recognized." The NCIC may also give an officer an idea
of the dangerousness of the persons that he is confronting. Information
supplied through the NCIC to employers and licensing agencies author-
ized to receive it12 undoubtedly speeds their decision-making processes
and helps eliminate applicants whose criminal records suggest 'that they
would be particularly unsuited for a sensitive position. The NCIC may
also facilitate the operation of the criminal justice system in matters of
bail, probation, sentencing, and parole." Although the NCIC's applica-
tion to these matters appears undocumented, its potential usefulness seems
clear, particularly for expediting the bail-setting process. The NCIC is
clearly a versatile tool whose benefits are not limited to criminal appre-
hension.
B. Costs
The detrimental effects of the NCIC mainly result from the greater
availability of an individual's criminal record once it is placed in the
NCCH file. 14 The group most obviously affected is persons seeking em-
ployment or licenses. Records will usually reach employers and licensing
boards in a legal manner since both the FBI and the state and local
participants in the NCIC may release records to such entities. 15 Unfor-
tunately, experience shows that unauthorized groups also receive criminal
records. One inquiry determined that police records were regularly re-
leased for preemployment investigations in St. Louis and Baltimore; in
New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston, influential em-
ployers could obtain records despite contrary policies or regulations.' 6 In
11 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
12 State and local agencies participating in the NCIC may provide records to
agencies and institutions in accordance with the laws of the state where they are
located. See DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 62; FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Jan., 1974, at 9. In addition, regulations interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2)
(1970), see note 2 supra, authorize the FBI to exchange records with railroad police,
national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC-Reserve-Insured
Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1972).
13 See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.D.C. 1971); Hearings on
H.R. 9272 Before a Subcomm. o the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 212-13 (1971) (statement of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover); FBI L. ENFORCE-
MENT BULL., Jan., 1974, at 9. The possibility of developing a nationwide computerized
information system for prosecutors which would be linked with the NCIC is men-
tioned in Hearings on Street Crime in America (Prosecution and Court Innovations)
Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1183-86,
1238 (1973).
14 This greater availability is also the key to the system's great utility.
15 See note 12 supra.
16 Hearings on S. 2732 Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 2732]. Contained in the report of the hearing is the statement of Aryeh
Neier and John Shattuck, for the American Civil Liberties Union, referring to the
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS
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some cases, review of a criminal record is necessary and useful for the
protection of the employer's or the public's interest, but in other cases
reference to a job or license applicant's record only results in an unneces-
sary handicap. The relevance of a criminal record varies with the type of
job or license being sought and the particular criminal history of the ap-
plicant. Where employers and licensing boards err on the conservative
side in their decisions, persons with criminal records may be needlessly
discriminated against. This discrimination is particularly unfair if the crim-
inal record involves an arrest followed by acquittal or failure to prosecute.
In these circumstances, a basic tenet of our criminal justice system asserts
that the individual arrested is innocent. Many employers will tend to as-
sume the opposite. 17
Unnecessary injury to an individual's reputation can also result if crim-
inal records stray from their proper paths. This type of injury could man-
ifest itself in the form of economic detriment or in the more intangible
form of social stigma.
The potential for information disclosure may have a "chilling effect" on
both the individual and the necessary tensions of the democratic system
as a whole.18 In recent years, the exercise of certain civil liberties has
sometimes involved the risk of arrest. Often the arrest is justified, but it
may also serve as a tool of harassment. With a national criminal record
system, the report of such an arrest may no longer nestle deep in the files
of some municipality. The record is far more likely to be stored in the
NCCH file, thereby becoming available in almost any jurisdiction in the
ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967). Their state-
ment mentions two other reports documenting loose security, access, and dissemina-
tion practices for police files.
Although most of the records systems involved in the documented abusive prac-
tices are manual systems, the computerization of records in the NCIC can be ex-
pected to increase the potential for unauthorized dissemination and misuse of crim-
inal records. Id.; see part II infra. In Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C.,
1971), the court considered a suit brought by a man detained as a burgulary suspect
in California to recover a record of the detention which had been forwarded to the
FBI. The effect of the NCIC on the availability of the record was discussed in plain-
tiff's brief. After examining the FBI's record-keeping operations the court concluded:
The Bureau cannot prevent improper dissemination and use of the ma-
terial it supplies to hundred of local agencies .... Control of the data
will be made more difficult and opportunities for improper use will in-
crease with the development of centralized state information centers to
be linked to the Bureau.
In short, with the increasing availability of fingerprints, technological
developments, and the enormous increase in population, the system is
out of effective control.
Id. at 727.
17 For a full discussion of the loss of employment opportunities due to the exis-
tence of a criminal record see Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1001-18, 1159-68 (1970). For discussions
of such problems in light of a proposed law on nullification of criminal records see
Hearings on S. 2732, supra note 16.
18 See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-26 (1967). See also Menard
v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.D.C. 1971).
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country. The deterrent impact on those facing potential arrest may be
marginal, but the balances of a democratic system are often tipped by
marginal differences.
Even legitimate use of criminal record information by criminal justice
agencies may result in harm to the individuals concerned. Through use of
the NCCH file, a judge or other public official could be provided with the
full criminal record of an arrested or convicted person where formerly
only a partial record from a single state might have been available. This
increase in criminal background information is rarely balanced by any
increase in information concerning family, employment, psychological his-
tory, or other noncriminal circumstances which may be equally critical
for, proper bail, probation, sentencing, or parole decisions. 19 Thus, in the
context of these important decisions, the ready availability of information
from the NCIC could tend to produce a one-sided picture of the arrested
or convicted individual's background.
It appears that the benefits of the NCIC, although substantial, are pur-
chased at the price of injury to individuals facing unnecessary economic
or social harm as a result of the wider availability of their criminal records.
Individual injury may result from legitimate as well as illegal use of the
system. The threat of such injury may lead to certain inhibiting effects on
activities necessary to a democratic system.
II. THE NCIC AND THE BALANCE OF
PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE
The essential problem presented by the NCIC is best framed as a
privacy-disclosure controversy. At the most general level, this controversy
is the result of the tension between two reasonable propositions. On the
one hand, rational decision-making in a complex and mobile society re-
quires that large amounts of information be widely available. On the
other hand, the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of such nec-
essary information interferes with certain psychological and economic pre-
rogatives of the individual, often collectively referred to as "rights of
privacy. ' ' 20 The privacy-disclosure controversy is not new. Law enforce-
ment officials have kept criminal records for many years. Disclosure of
these records has long resulted in similar social and economic detriment.2 1
What difference, then, has the presence of the NCIC made? The answer
19 In at least one major city private groups have attempted to participate in bail
hearings to offer family background or employment information for the consideration
of the decisionmaker. Chicago Sun-Times, June 2, 1971, at 40, col. 1.
20 Professor Arthur R. Miller, in a seminal article on computers and privacy, de-
fined the basic attribute of a right of privacy as the individual's ability to control the
flow of information which concerns or describes him. Miller, Personal Privacy in the
Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented
Society, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1969). Although protection against unsolicited
mailed pornography has also been called a privacy right, suggesting that privacy also
consists of some control over information flowing to an individual, for purposes of
this article Professor Miller's definition remains useful.
21 See generally Special Project, supra note 17.
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is found by examining the new factors introduced during the transition
from manual record-keeping to a computerized databank, which has made
criminal records more widely available and upset the traditional balance
between privacy and disclosure.
Four basic factors distinguish the NCIC from previous criminal record
systems.
1. Centralization of Data-The NCIC is designed to bring together
criminal data compiled throughout the entire United States. Part of this
centralization is physical: records from many jurisdictions are placed in
the storage devices of the central computer facility in Washington, D.C.
Part of the centralization is logical: the system :ties together data stored in
state and metropolitan criminal information systems. All records become
part of a nationwide computer and telecommunications network.
22
2. Decentralization of Access-By centralizing records in one com-
puter network, the NCIC makes any record in the system available at any
one of the planned 45,000 terminals 23 across the country. Leased com-
munication lines link the existing computers and terminals.
3. Proliferation of Copies-The computer, like a photocopy machine,
will faithfully produce copies at superhuman speeds. Unlike a photocopy
machine, however, the computer can deposit copies at several geograph-
ical locations by routing output to any requesting terminal.2
4
4. Abstraction, Abbreviation, and Standardization of Data-The struc-
ture of computer languages, control programs, and storage devices makes
every letter and number in a record important. The result is a record dis-
tilled into codes, abbreviations, and terse verbal formulations.2 5
Centralization of data, decentralization of access, and the proliferation
of copies all contribute to the great availability of data from the NCIC
system. The possibility of illegal access is enhanced since there are many
more opportunities for corruption of personnel and since the broad net-
work of communication lines is vulnerable to electronic penetration. -6
Simultaneously, the abstraction, abbreviation, and standardization of data
22 It appears that the original concept of a national criminal history file as proposed
by SEARCH (see note 7 supra) was based on a central index which would coordinate
the exchange of records maintained primarily in state computer systems. DATABANKS
IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 58. Although this is still the ultimate concept for
the NCCH file, currently the national "index" file actually contains the complete
record for multistate offenders. Indications are that this practice will continue until
all states have developed the necessary computer capabilities. FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Jan., 1974, at 10.
23 Letter from Francis W. Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts to the Editor of
the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 40, col. 4.
24 For most purposes a computer can treat a printing device located hundreds of
miles away in the same way that it treats a device located in the same room. In both
cases, the desired message is transmitted via electromagnetic signals over a communi-
cations channel.
25 See generally the portion of plaintiffs brief in Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp.
718 (D.D.C. 1971), which is reprinted in Hearings on S. 2732, supra note 16, at 179-81.
26 Computer communication lines resemble, and often consist of, telephone lines.
Thus, they can be "tapped" in much the same manner. See A. WESTIN supra note 18,
at 79-80.
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make it more likely that information will be misunderstood, and, in the
case of criminal history records, less likely that the record will convey a
full and accurate picture of the individual involved. Thus, greater avail-
ability makes the label of criminal more inescapable than ever, even for
those who have been rehabilitated and seek to lead normal lives.
Where stored data such as the license and serial numbers of stolen
property are concerned, -the factors outlined above have less significance.
While potential inaccuracies and the cryptic quality of computer data con-
tinue to be problems, numbers do not undergo abbreviation or abstraction.
The greater availability of license and serial number data may affect crim-
inals, but making the criminals' task more difficult or risky cannot be con-
strued as prejudicing their rights.
In addition to the new problems associated with the four factors dis-
cussed above, the accuracy and currency problems of manual record-
keeping continue under the NCIC. Ironically, in the midst of electronic
wizardry, update and correction functions still depend on the skill and
energy of human beings. Indeed, accuracy and currency problems in the
NCCH file may prove to be aggravated in comparison to the FBI's pre-
vious manual system since the state criminal justice agency first entering
the record into the file is given the primary responsibility for its updating
and modification. 27 Whether accuracy and currency can be maintained in
a system with such diffuse responsibility is questionable.
Since computer databanks are widely accepted and their use in an ex-
panding NCIC is likely to continue, the four factors previously mentioned
will continue to affect the balance between privacy and disclosure in crim-
inal record-keeping. The next section assesses the capacity of existing
statutes, regulations, judicial doctrines, and operational policies to function
as preventive and remedial safeguards in redressing the changed balance
between privacy and disclosure.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT
SAFEGUARDS FOR THE NCIC
The operational balance struck between the protection of individual
privacy and the needs of law enforcement in a system like the NCIC will
to a great extent be a function of the legal and administrative environ-
ment in which it functions. In order to balance effectively the social costs
and benefits arising from the greater availability of individual criminal
data, there must be legal and administrative safeguards which regulate the
availability of records and attempt to blunt the derimental effects of
greater availability. The legal and administrative environment in which
the NCIC currently operates is derived from three sources: 1) the statutes
and regulations on which the NCIC is based; 2) judicially developed doc-
trines grounded in common law or the Constitution; and 3) the NCIC's
27 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb., 1972, at 26.
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own informal procedures, guidelines, and customs. A brief review of these
sources suggests that current safeguards for the NCIC are inadequate.
In examining a program of safeguards for the NCIC NCCH file it is
useful to define four distinct categories of data:
1. Arrest Records-records of arrests where no prosecution fol-
lowed or no conviction resulted from prosecution.
2. Conviction Records-records of actual criminal convictions,
including guilty pleas and pleas of nolo contendere; related rec-
ords concerning sentencing, parole, and other contacts with the
criminal justice system arising from convictions.
3. Nullified Conviction Records-records of conviction which
have been the subject of a successful expungement proceeding.
4. Narrative Records-raw investigative or surveillance data.2 8
Criminal records differ across and within -these categories as to the sensi-
tivity of the data contained, their public availability, their accuracy as
reports of past criminal activity, and their reliability as predictors of future
criminal behavior. These differences mean that the type of preventive
and remedial efforts which are necessary, possible, and acceptable will
vary according to the kind of record involved. Thus, one measure of the
effectiveness of a system of safeguards is whether it responds to differing
types of records in an appropriate manner.
A. Statutes and Regulations Affecting the NCIC
The basic statutory authority for the NCIC is a broad information col-
lecting and exchanging mandate given to the Attorney General. 29 The
statute dates essentially from 1930.30 Its language is open-ended both as
to the kinds of information which can be collected and maintained :1 and
as to the institutions that may participate in the "exchange" of records.3 2
Thus, the FBI is authorized to include any type of criminal record in the
NCIC and to disseminate any record it maintains to a broad range of
28 Currently, the NCIC's NCCH file contains arrest and conviction records. Narra-
tive records have not been put into the system. A NCIC spokesperson has indicated
that the FBI has no present plan to put individual intelligence information into any
computerized databank and, in any case, this would not be attempted until the use
and protection of this data is better understood. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra
note 3, at 63.
Nullified records might exist in the NCCH file since several states provide statutory
procedures for the nullification or expungement of criminal records. See Comment,
Branded: Arrest Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss. L. J. 928, 931-34 (1973);
Special Project, supra note 17, at 1149 nn.22-23. Such proceduees usually require
the sealing or destruction of all copies of the record nullified. Although the FBI will
honor requests to return records, state officials may overlook the existence of the
FBI copy.
29 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970). See note 2 supra.
30 A ruling secured from the Attorney General declared that the 1930 federal
statute was a sufficient legal foundation for the NCIC, thereby making new enabling
legislation unnecessary. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 52.
31 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (1970). See note 2 supra.
32 Id. § 534(a)(2).
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governmental and private institutions.13 The sole statutory sanction for
abuse of the information collecting and exchanging functions is directed
toward recipient organizations. This provision, which subjects the informa-
tion exchange "to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiv-
ing departments or agencies," 34 has seldom been invoked. 5 Although
legislation designed to build additional statutory protections around the
operation of criminal justice information systems was proposed as early
as September, 1971,36 the basic statutory authority has not been mod-
ified. As a result, the NCIC can maintain and disseminate virtually any
type of criminal record with few limitations. Individuals whose records
are maintained have no federal statutory remedies tailored to redress
abuse of the system, no matter how sensitive the recorded information
or how unreliable and prejudicial it is for the purpose for which it was
released.
B. Judicially Developed Safeguards
Although judicially developed doctrine provides little that is of direct
value as a safeguard for the NCIC, recent cases suggest several positions
which the courts may take to protect against unnecessary maintenance
and dissemination of criminal records. :' The traditional judicial refusal
to interfere with the handling of criminal data3 s has been abandoned as
courts take greater notice of the disabilities resulting from criminal record
disclosure. 39 Several courts have attempted to set limits on use and dis-
33 A specific regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1972), now limits the class of partici-
pants in the exchange. See also note 12 supra.
34 28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1970).
35 The FBI has withdrawn dissemination privileges from only six small town police
departments in the last ten years, despite "overwhelming evidence" of improper dis-
semination and unauthorized use of such data in recent years. Hearings on S. 2732
supra note 16, at 177 (statement of Aryeh Neier and John Shattuck for the American
Civil Liberties Union).
36 See, e.g., S. 2546, Criminal Justice Information Systems Security and Privacy
Act of 1971, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
37 See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v.
Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487
P.2d 211 (1st Div. 1971). These cases have received attention in several articles and
notes. See, e.g., Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of
Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 32 (1972); Comment, Branded: Arrest
Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss. L. J. 928 (1973); Comment, Police Records of
Arrest: A Brief for the Right to Remove Them from Police Files, 17 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 263 (1972); Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records:
A Legislative Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 654 (1972); Comment, Retention and
Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 850 (1971).
38 Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response,
38 U. CHt. L. REV. 850, 854 (1971). See cases collected id. at 854 n.20.
39 See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morrow
v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-43 (1969); Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc. 2d
759, 762, 317 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
The Menard court made the following finding:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known,
[VOL. 7:594
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tribution of arrest records by law enforcement agencies. 40 Although there
appear to be no cases supporting judicial controls on the retention and
distribution of conviction records by law enforcement groups, one court
has moved to prevent disclosure made by private organizations.
41
A tort privacy theory is the only well-developed judicial doctrine cur-
rently available to courts for use in cases involving injury from the dis-
closure of criminal records. 42 However, this theory excludes a number of
injurious disclosure situations where protection would be desirable. 43
While a constitutional privacy doctrine appeared as an explicit ground of
decision in at least one case involving criminal records,44 it is probably
not a reliable legal theory for ensuring the protection of specific privacy
rights not yet firmly recognized. 45
Most courts treat the problem of maintenance and disclosure of crim-
inal records as one of balancing4 6 the individual's interest in nondisclosure
against the public interest in the ready availability of criminal records as
may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct eco-
nomic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation may be
substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious.
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (1970). The cases cited above all dealt with
arrest records. The catalogue of disabilities would be still more extensive for con-
viction records.
40 See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); Eddy v. Moore,
5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1st Div. 1971). The Menard court construed the
FBI's statutory authority (see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra) narrowly to
find that the Bureau was "without authority to disseminate arrest records outside the
Federal Government for employment, licensing or related purposes whether or not
the record reflects a later conviction." 328 F. Supp. at 727. A rider to a bill passed
several months after this decision restored the authority of the FBI to its previous
status for a period of one year. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 61.
41See, e.g., Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971).
42 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). Of the four distinct types
of privacy invasion discussed, the action based on public disclosure of private facts
appears to have the greatest conceptual congruence with an action based on disclosure
of criminal records. The elements of this disclosure tort are: 1) that the facts dis-
closed be private facts not public ones; 2) that the disclosure be public not private;
and 3) that the matter disclosed be one which would be offensive and objectionable
to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. Id. at 810-11. The "false light" or
defamation type privacy action may also be useful to a plaintiff who has been harmed
by publication of his record. See generally Comment, supra note 38, at 868-69.
43 Comment, supra note 38, at 869; Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of
Criminal Records: A Legislative Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 654, 655-56 (1972).
For example, disclosure to an employer might not be "public disclosure" sufficient to
support an action. Disclosure of a conviction which is a matter of public record may
fail to satisfy the requirement for disclosure of a private fact.
44 Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1st Div. 1971).
45 In the following cases, specific constitutional rights of privacy were found:
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (against eavesdropping); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (against invasion of marital privacy); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (against compelled submission to truth drugs); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (against unrestrained search and seizure); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (against surreptitious wiretapping).
46 See, e.g., cases cited in note 37 supra.
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an aid to law enforcement. 47 Although the balancing approach is flexible
and offers no theoretical barriers to further judicial development of safe-
guards against abuses of criminal records, its flexibility will mean delay
and uncertainty until the doctrines mature. Judicial doctrines, in their
current posture, show potential as a partial solution for the problems of
maintenance and dissemination of arrest records, but they fail to deal
adequately with other types of criminal records or with the damage that
can result from abusive dissemination.
C. The NCIC's Informal Safeguards
While it is difficult to tell exactly what sort of informal safeguards the
FBI has imposed on the operations of the NCIC, it appears that an initial
reluctance 48 to accept a system of safeguards has faded.49 A Security
and Confidentiality Committee created by the NCIC's Advisory Policy
Group has developed a set of recommendations which draws heavily on
the extensive security and privacy policy recommendations of Project
SEARCH. 50 These recommendations include limitations on the type of
records maintained; records of minor violations (e.g., drunkenness and
vagrancy) and juvenile offenses would be excluded. The Advisory Policy
Group further proposed that records be removed in accordance with the
state or federal law binding the agency submitting the record. The quality
of the data maintained would be assured by certain practices relating to
accuracy including the use of system audits. Separation of the criminal
record databank from other databanks containing noncriminal information
47 The concerns of law enforcement agencies and the individual interest in privacy
may not always be the only factors which should influence the balancing process.
Other interests supporting disclosure in a given case relate to freedom of the press and
the value of an informed public. Somewhat less compelling concerns are those of
commercial operations seeking to avoid the risks incurred through hiring or dealing
with individuals possessing criminal records. These other interests will, in most cases,
be insignificant when compared with the interests of the individual and the criminal
justice system.
48 Evidence of this initial reluctance appears in a letter from Jerome J. Daunt of
the NCIC to 0. J. Hawkins of the California Department of Justice, reprinted in
Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1026-27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Federal Data
Banks]. Mr. Daunt's letter expressed general disapproval of the broad scope of the
interim report of the SEARCH Security and Privacy Committee. Specifically, he felt
that the report should not speak of an absolute right to privacy. Rather it should
confine itself to existing judicial decisions and not speculate on what courts might say
in the future. Mr. Daunt also felt that the report expressed a distrust of the entire
criminal justice system and that further studies of the privacy-security matter could
be deferred.
49 The FBI's more recent attitude is evinced by a statement that "[t]he FBI also
encourages the enactment of Federal legislation which the Congress may deem ap-
propriate to the preservation of rights of the individual and of our society." FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan., 1974, at 10.
50 DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 61. For information on SEARCH
see note 7 supra.
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and the imposition of physical, personnel, and technical security measures
would enhance the integrity of the system. Dissemination would be limited
by ensuring that all NCIC users are criminal justice agencies. Further-
more, under the Group's recommendations the individual would be given
the right to see and challenge the contents of his record. 51 This extensive
program was "endorsed" in June, 1971, by former FBI Director Hoo-
ver. -5 2 Currently, state and local participants in the NCIC are required to
sign a contract with the director of the FBI, agreeing to abide by this set
of safeguards and any future ones. 53 If, as a practical matter, such a pro-
gram were fully operational within the FBI and each of the state and
local participants, it would be a major step toward protection of individ-
uals whose records are kept in the NCCH file.
In light of the preceding discussion, there exist serious doubts about the
adequacy of legal and administrative safeguards for the NCIC.54 Neither
the statutory basis of the NCIC nor existing judicially developed doctrines
provide sufficient limitations on 'the maintenance and dissemination of var-
ious types of records or effective remedies for abusive disclosure. While
the informal system of safeguards endorsed by the FBI does show a
broad awareness of the security and privacy problems presented by the
NCIC, it can not be truly adequate until it is given greater visibility and
enforceability as a program of legislation and administrative regulations.
IV. DESIGN OF A COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARD
PROGRAM FOR THE NCIC
The increased potential for damage55 because of the greater availabil-
ity of criminal data stored in the NCIC's NCCH file, 56 coupled with the
general lack of effective legal and administrative safeguards for the sys-
tem, 57 make it clear that a scheme of regulations and remedies must be
developed. The duty to design and implement effective protective and
remedial measures falls on legislators and the administrators of the
NCIC.58 The following discussion surveys some of the more important
factors to be considered in system design.
There are various approaches to the implementation of safeguards for
criminal record information systems such as the NCIC's NCCH file. Al-
though some of the proposals discussed below were advanced as general
51 DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 62.
52 Id.
53 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 233 (1973).
54 For a somewhat more emphatic statement of the same conclusion see that por-
tion of the opinion of the Menard court quoted in note 16 supra.
55 See part I B supra.
56 See part II supra.
57 See part III supra.
58 After cataloging the faults of the FBI's criminal record-keeping activities, the
Menard court reached the conclusion that "[t]he Bureau needs legislative guidance
and there must be a national policy developed in this area which will have built into
it adequate sanctions and administrative safeguards." 328 F. Supp. 718, 726-27 (1971).
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protective remedies without specific reference to computerized data-
banks, others were clearly inspired by the existence of the NCIC's
NCCH file. It is suggested, however, that the increased interest in safe-
guards for criminal records is in part a response to the presence of com-
puterized databanks, even in the case of proposals which do not specif-
ically acknowledge the new technology.
Approaches to the problems of providing safeguards can be divided
into two types. The first approach includes safeguards directed at the
functions of the computerized databank itself-the collection, mainten-
ance and dissemination of criminal data. Included are controls on data-
bank content, which would limit the acquisition and maintenance of
certain types of data,5 9 ensure that data maintained are current and accu-
rate,60 and provide for the nullification or expungement of certain kinds
of records.6 ' Other approaches of this type are aimed at the way data
flow from the system. These approaches include procedures and penalties
limiting disseminationG2 and deterring physical or electronic penetration
of the system. The second type of safeguard does not focus directly on the
procedures of data acquisition, maintenance, and dissemination, but rather
on external means of reducing the damage done by a given pattern of
systemic operation. Included in this category are attempts to control re-
view of criminal data in making certain decisions where its consideration
may be unnecessarily prejudicial., :' Additional procedures of this type
would give an individual some knowledge of and control over records
concerning him or her."64 A full program of safeguards must be con-
structed from elements taken from several of these approaches.
A. Specific Approaches
1. Provisions Affecting Data Content-Limits on the type of data
which may be acquired can prevent many problems from ever arising,
but such limits would be difficult to impose on any system under the con-
trol of the FBI because of its broad information-collecting authority. 65
This broad mandate makes expansion of the kinds of data computerized
59 See, e.g., S. 2697, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., § 534(c)(1) (1973); H.R. 188, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess., § 3102(d) (1973); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2(a), (d), (e) (1973);
Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records: A Legislative Pro-
posal, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 654, 681-82 (1972.
60 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2(b), (c) (1973).
61 See, e.g., S. 2697, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 534(c)(1) (1973) S. 2732, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., §§ 3, 4, 5, 11 (1971); Steele, supra note 37, at 50-53.
62 See, e.g., H.R. 11483, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 534 (b), (c) (1973); S. 2697, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 534(d), (f) (1973); H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3101, 3102,
3105 (1973); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1973); S. 2732, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 7(a)(1) (1971); Comment, supra note 59, at 679-86.
63 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3106 (1973); S. 2732, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess., §§ 7(a)(3), 7(b) (1971); Steele, supra note 37, at 54-56.
64 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3103 (1973); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 4 (1973); Comment, supra note 59, at 686-87.
65 See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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both convenient and economical, since both the data and the skills and
facilities for its collection and maintenance are already within one orga-
nization. Should the FBI choose to computerize its narrative files,66 for
example, it could utilize existing NCIC databank facilities. Assuming that
control over the kinds of data computerized is desirable, one solution is
to set up an independent agency to administer the databank. The agency's
collection and maintenance of records could be conveniently limited
through separate statutory or regulatory authorization. If the NCIC re-
mains under the FBI, its independent operation67 should be ensured
and its authority to acquire and maintain records should be separately
defined. Until better security facilities and procedures are available, the
agency's authority should not include the acquisition and maintenance of
narrative records6" or other data which are highly sensitive or whose ac-
curacy is in doubt. Other restrictions forbidding the acquisition and reten-
tion of certain types of arrest records,"9 specific kinds of conviction
data,-, and all nullified and expunged records7 1 have also been proposed.
Procedures ensuring the accuracy and currency of records are essential.
A provision imposing such a duty,72 however, could prove to have little
more than cosmetic value unless specific measures designed to promote it
are articulated and applied. 73 Means of determining which records are
inaccurate or out-of-date must be provided together with time limits for
entering corrections and updates after notification of error or change of
status.74 An audit by an independent group 75 could provide the neces-
sary checking mechanism and would probably be more effective than al-
lowing an individual to check his own record. 76 But auditing by an inde-
66 See note 28 supra.
67 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (1973), which provides that "Each
criminal data bank shall be independent and distinct from any other data collection
or storage operation."
68 See note 28 supra.
69 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3102(d) (1973) (excluding arrest
records more than two years old for which there is no prosecution pending and
arrest records for which the responsible prosecuting attorney feels no prosecution is
warranted); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(a) (1973) (excluding arrest records
which are at least two years old if no other arrest appears within the two intervening
years).
70 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(c) (1973) (excluding conviction
records more than ten years old, if the intervening ten years have been conviction-
free. Juvenile records and records of any offense for which the maximum penalty is
less than six months imprisonment or a fine of not more than one hundred dollars
are also excluded.).
71 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3102(d) (1973) (excluding records
which are expunged under a provision of state law).
72 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b) (1973) (providing for "periodic
updating" and for making additions, corrections, or deletions within ninety days of
the receipt of new information).
73 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b) (1973) (providing for a syste-
matic outside audit for accuracy). See also text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
74 See note 72 supra.
75 See note 73 supra.
76 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a) (1973). Although an individual
who understood an auditing program and was aware of the items in his criminal
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pendent group could present an additional security risk, since the auditors
would be privy to all information in the files.
Additional verification measures, providing incentives to each of the
various agencies responsible for maintaining the records,77 could be built
into the computer programs which interact with the files. The computer,
with its tireless and virtually boundless memory, is ideally suited both to
provide reminders that certain records need further attention and to purge
from the active files any obsolete or inaccurate records.78 A computer is
most effective in detecting certain types of formal errors such as omissions
or the use of a symbol or abbreviation that it does not recognize. If a
record conforms to the prescribed format, however, content errors can be
detected only by comparison with an independent source of accurate infor-
mation. As a result, an effective program for monitoring the accuracy and
currency of the information would probably have to include manual and
automatic auditing.
Procedures for the expungement or nullificationil of certain kinds of
criminal records are an attractive solution because they appeal to the
notion that an individual should be given a chance to clean his slate and
make a fresh start. But the formulation and implementation of such pro-
cedures present certain problems. First, the proper criteria for nullification
are not easy to define and agree on."' Second, the structure of the NCIC
system encourages the proliferation and broad dissemination of record
copies.8' If nullification is to be truly effective, all copies of the record to
be nullified must be located and destroyed or collected and sealed. Legis-
lation setting up nullification procedures would have to be supplemented
by a system of accountability 2 for copies. Nullification procedures would
record might be more scrupulous in verifying the accuracy of his record than official
auditors, this type of awareness and understanding could probably not be found in
a criminal population characterized by poor education and mistrust of official
processes. However, allowing for a personal audit of an indvidual's record may have
an additional value beyond its function in an accuracy program, because of the
psychological reassurance and sense of control which it gives the individual. See text
accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
77 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
78 One such measure is already in effect. A programming feature for the file of
stolen vehicle records purges any records which have been in the file for more than
ninety days without having the vehicle identification number filled in. NCIC News-
letter, Apr., 1973.
79 Expungement and nullification both refer to the procedure whereby a criminal
record is removed from the normal pattern of maintenance and dissemination. Since
a major bill on the subject (S. 2732, Offender Rehabilitation Act, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971)) refers to the procedure as nullification, that terminology is used herein.
Nullification procedures usually consist of the removal of records from files accom-
panied by their destruction or return to the person involved or the sealing and segre-
gation of the record.
80 See generally Hearings on S. 2732, supra note 16; Hearings on Federal Data
Banks, supra note 48, at 856-57.
81 See part II B supra.
82 In the July, 1973, issue of the NCIC Newsletter an item appeared referring to
the increasing state use of nullification procedures and the concomitant need to
"establish appropriate procedures to maintain accountability for the receipt/destruc-
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reincorporate into criminal record systems some of the forgiving and for-
getting which allowed deserving individuals to escape or live down their
criminal record under local manual record systems. If nullification criteria
were properly selected, this procedure could distinguish between records
which need to be kept and those which can be discarded, and would ac-
complish this result more efficiently than the somewhat random process
of human memory.
2. Provisions Affecting Movement of Data-Procedures and penalties
designed to deter physical and electronic penetration of the NCIC com-
puter system and communication network are a necessary part of any
adequate program of safeguards. The most appropriate topics for legisla-
tion in this area are provisions defining offenses, specifying penalties for
"data snooping," and articulating the duty to provide reasonable security
measures.
Legislation controlling dissemination of data is the key part of any safe-
guard program since, despite occasional leaks from the system, the vast
majority of the data circulated will reach and remain at its destination
under the authority of the system's rules on dissemination. Further, if
there are no limits on the types of data that can be collected and main-
ained,8 3 no programs for ensuring accuracy and currency of records,
84
and no procedures for nullification,8 5 effective protection can still be
realized through utilization of strict rules limiting dissemination. In fact,
the rules on dissemination should be a function of the adequacy of mea-
sures provided under other approaches. Thus, a limit on dissemination
can compensate for a liberal policy on data collection while preserving
access to the records for criminal justice agencies. 86 Limitations on the
dissemination of records whose acquisition and maintenance are already
forbidden are not totally redundant. When criminal actions or civil suits
for data abuse are brought, the disseminator may be a more available
defendant than the person responsible for maintenance and acquisition of
the record that found its way into the wrong hands.
The basic problem in designing controls for dissemination is to match
classes of data with groups that have a legitimate need or interest in them.
To solve this problem, it may be necessary to refine the categories of
records outlined previously8 7 into smaller units which fit the narrow
needs of or are best suited to the predictable attitudes of the groups that
tion/dissemination of CCH records". The item was first published in the January,
1972, Newsletter and republished "because of its continuing importance in maintain-
ing system security." For a provision setting up a system of accountability see H.R.
9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(f) (1973).
83 See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
84 See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
85 See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
86 For example, if a high value is placed on making arrest records or older, nulli-
fied records available to criminal justice agencies, system policy might allow such
records to be maintained and disseminated to law enforcement agencies, but not to
employers and licensing boards.
87 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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desire access to the data. For example, while a law enforcement agency
might be authorized to receive a full arrest record, including arrests not
followed by convictions, an employer bank might be entitled to see only
arrest data which are less than one year old.," It may also be useful to
provide for dissemination of processed versions of data to particular
groups that have a legitimate use for information but should not see it in
its original form. For example, research groups or special task forces may
need data that could be provided in edited form without loss of useful-
ness. The editing process would remove individual names and aggregate
records 9 so that no single individual, or even some particularly sensitive
group, is identifiable. 9 Provisions for the release of certain kinds of data
to the news media may also be appropriate. 91
Legal remedies for incidents of abuse must be established if any dis-
semination controls are to be effective. Both criminal penalties92 and civil
causes of action 931 should be provided. In addition, sanctions affecting
offending organizations9 4 can supplement the deterrent effect of the sanc-
tions against individuals.
3. Provisions Affecting Utilization of Data-Controls on the utilization
of criminal data in making critical decisions where its consideration might
cause unnecessary prejudice can provide an additional level of protection.
Direct restrictions on the consideration of a criminal record and the rejec-
tion of an applicant because of his criminal record could be applied to
many employers and licensing boards.15 Applicants confronting employ-
88 Other distinctions between records have been suggested. In Menard v. Mitchell
the court of appeals found that an expungement remedy for arrest records might
depend on whether or not the arrest was based on probable cause. 430 F.2d 486, 491-
92 (D.C. Cir. 1970). On remand the district court found, however, that "the question
of probable cause has little to do with the merits of the underlying controvelsy." 328
F. Supp. 718, 724 (D.D.C. 1971).
89 One of the great advantages of computerized databanks for researchers is the
speed at which an edited version of the data can be made available by running pro-
grams which strip off and reorganize various data items so that the data becomes not
only more usable, but less likely to permit the identification of any single individual.
9OSee, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(f) (973). The bill provides that
"Data may be disseminated by a criminal data bank for the purpose of research, but
no data so disseminated shall be identifiable to any person."
91 See, e.g., the provision suggested in Comment, supra note 59, at 684-85.
92 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3107(b) (1973) (fine of not more than
$1000, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 6(a)(1) (1973) (fine of $5000 and imprisonment for not more than five
years).
9 3 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3107(a) (1973) (action for actual
damages, reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs authorized); H.R. 9783,
83d Cong., 1st Sess., § 6(a)(2) (1973) (actions for injunctive and declaratory relief
against the United States or the responsible official and for actual and punitive dam-
ages with a minimum of $1000 per violation).
94 See, e.g., H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 6(b) (1973) (providing for termination
of federal financial assistance to the databank guilty of a violation and for cutting
off the offending databank from the exchange of information).
95 See, e.g., Steele, supra note 37, at 54-55 (excluding from consideration in licens-
ing applications any criminal record which has been excluded from maintenance in
official state criminal files, and forbidding the rejection of an applicant on the basis
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ers or boards who inquire about criminal records can be given the right
to deny the existence of arrest9 6 and nullified conviction records.97 The
difficulty of actually examining the decision process of an employer or a
licensing board makes enforcement of such restrictions problematic, but
the problems are comparable to those arising under race, sex, or age dis-
crimination statutes.
While in most contexts the goal is to prevent consideration of criminal
data, in some situations where the data must be examined, a statute or
regulation requiring consideration of countervailing data provides a partial
remedy. For example, consideration of available family, employment, or
psychological data in bail, probation, sentencing, or parole decisions might
offset the effect of full criminal record availability. As in the case of re-
strictions placed on employer and licensing board consideration of criminal
data, this type of rule attempts to reach a mental process and is difficult
to enforce. Nevertheless, it might increase decisionmakers' awareness of
the built-in bias of our current databanks, which immortalize the evil that
men do.
4. Provisions for Individual Control and Notice-Proposed procedures
designed to give an individual a certain measure of control over his record
are generally based on four elements: 1) the individual's right to see his
own record;98 2) the right to view a listing of organizations which have
requested and received his record;"!' 3) the right to receive notice of any
request for or incident of dissemination of his record; 100 and 4) the
right to challenge errors in his record and to have them corrected.' 0
The first three provisions can do little more than tell the individual who
knows what about his criminal past. Assuming that the record was correct
when disseminated, any damage resulting from these prior disclosures will
probably be beyond remedy. The fourth provision not only gives the per-
son a direct opportunity to ensure that his record is correct and up-to-
date, but it also places useful pressure on the responsible agency to keep
the record accurate and current. This approach, then, can reduce an in-
dividual's fears by keeping him informed of his status and enhance the
effectiveness of any program for maintaining accuracy and currency of
of a record which is maintained, but which contains no arrest or conviction consti-
tuting a bona fide occupational disqualification for the type and character of work
under consideration).
9 6 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3106 (1973) (permitting a person
questioned about his arrest record to consider the question as referring only to arrest
records which a databank may lawfully disseminate, maintain, or use).
97 See, e.g., H.R. 2732, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 7(b) (1971) (providing that the oc-
currence of events leading to a criminal record item may be denied When that item
has been nullified); Steele, supra note 37, at 56.9 BSee, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3103 (1973); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess., § 4(a) (1973); Comment, supra note 59, at 686-88.
99 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., fst Sess., § 3103 (1973); Comment, supra note
59, at 686.
100 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 59, at 686.
101 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3104 (1973); H.R. 9783, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 4(a) (1973).
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records. The main disadvantages of this approach are the costs of main-
taining the bureaucracy to support these rights and the potential for abuse
if effective identification procedures are not used when persons request
record review. The provision for notice of requests for and incidents of
dissemination could impose a burden on both the NCIC and the indiv-
idual involved if a particular record were widely disseminated.
B. Overall Design Issues
There are three overall design considerations which should be incor-
porated into any comprehensive system of safeguards for the NCIC.
First, the effectiveness of the safeguards will depend on which provisions
are embodied in law and which take the form of administrative regula-
tions or informal system procedures and guidelines. Legal provisions are
more visible and enforceable, while administrative procedures offer greater
flexibility. Provisions defining civil remedies and criminal penalties and
articulating duties to promote data accuracy and system security must
have statutorily conferred enforceability. Provisions establishing individual
rights or delineating significant limitations on the system should also have
statutory status since they can provide public reassurance. On the other
hand, provisions likely to be directly dependent on particular computer
programs and hardward require the more flexible form of regulations or
guidelines, since no computer system is immune to technical evolution
and lawmaking seldom keeps abreast of technology. Provisions detailing
specific measures against physical or electronic penetration of the NCIC
computer network and specifying the verification and purging functions
of the computer are more appropriate for informal administrative trcat-
ment.
The second overall design issue concerns the binding scope of the safe-
guards. Although the NCIC was conceived as a cooperative venture be-
tween the FBI and state law enforcement agencies, the label of cooper-
ation cannot conceal the fact that delicate problems of federalism are
involved. 1° 2 To be truly effective, a program of safeguards would have to
apply uniformly to the FBI and all state participants. But agreement on
important policy issues such as limits on dissemination and criteria for
nullification may not be easy to reach. 1 3 Without uniform policies in
102 For an expression of concern over problems of this type see Letter from the
Illinois Law Enforcement Commission to Attorney General Mitchell, Oct. 15, 1970,
reprinted in Hearings on Federal Data Banks, supra note 48, at 1025-26.
103 An incident providing evidence of the necessity for a uniform nationwide pro-
gram of safeguards for information in the NCIC and the difficulty of agreeing on
such a program was sparked by Massachusetts' refusal, in June, 1973, to join the
NCIC. Massachusetts felt that the safeguards of other participating criminal records
systems were insufficient and that NCIC participation would subvert the measures
which Massachusetts enforced in its own system for the protection of her citizens.
Massachusetts' refusal to join was met by a Justice Department suit aimed at open-
ing Massachusetts' files to the Justice Department or any other federal agency. At-
torney General Richardson later ordered the suit dropped. Massachusetts has condi-
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these crucial areas, the degree of protection afforded an individual would
depend upon the policies of the state from which his record originates
or the state from which the request is made. Proposed legislation suggests
that Congress expects to be able to exert its legislative power only over
agencies of the federal government and federally funded state agen-
cies.10 4 It would be unfortunate if limitations on federal power prevented
the development of an adequate, uniform set of safeguards for the NCIC.
The third overall design issue focuses on the integration of the various
approaches outlined above. The purpose of promulgating an adequate
system of safeguards for the NCIC is to establish a working balance be-
tween privacy and disclosure. The balance struck must assure that accurate
criminal data are readily available to law enforcement groups and a lim-
ited number of other institutions having a true need for it, while ensuring
that no unnecessary disclosure prejudicial to individual privacy occurs. To
accomplish this task, the designer of a system of safeguards must be aware
of the effects of each protective measure on this primary objective. Fur-
thermore, he must realize that a combination of approaches can produce
effective results. For example, a system governed by strict limits on dis-
semination and a comprehensive expungement plan, combined with a
broad acquisition and maintenance mandate, might offer the same protec-
tion as a system combining restricted acquisition and maintenance with
liberal dissemination and limited nullification. The advantage of the for-
mer system is that it allows maximum availability of information to a
limited number of participants having the greatest need for access. The
designer must be aware that while a basic decision sharply limiting the
types of data which can be maintained affords maximum protection to
individuals whose records are excluded, it also deprives law enforcement
agencies and other participants of potentially useful information. Since a
composite system of safeguards can be designed by incorporating elements
from several approaches, the selection of these elements should be gov-
erned by their interdependence and the unique values which they pro-
mote.
V. CONCLUSION
When viewed from a neutral perspective, the NCIC is simply a means
for facilitating the aggregation and distribution of useful information.
NCIC's distinctiveness lies in its ability to fulfill this function on a na-
tional scale and to distribute the desired information to the point of
request within seconds. From this perspective, the NCIC must be viewed
not only as a means of spreading criminal information across the country,
tioned its participation in the NCIC on the institution of federal safeguards equiva-
lent to its own. Letter from Francis W. Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts to the
Editor of the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 40, col. 4.
104 See, e.g., H.R. 188, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which is aimed at officers or
employees of the United States or of a federally assisted law enforcement agency and
H.R. 9783, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which applies to criminal databanks estab-
lished and supported by the United States.
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but also as an opportunity for fine-tuning the flow of criminal justice in-
formation to institutions which can use it effectively and judiciously. This
new opportunity carries with it the responsibility for answering many ques-
tions about the proper use of the system. By enabling desired criminal
data to be widely available, the NCIC forces consideration of the issue of
who should have access to what data. The boundaries of time, distance,
and cost, which previously determined the answer, no longer function as
such rigid constraints. The resolution of this issue is far from easy because
the underlying decisions involve uncharted areas of law, psychology, and
politics. The necessary and proper boundaries of individual privacy are
extremely elusive. The value of criminal data in predicting future anti-
social behavior is unclear. The lack of clear answers, however, should
not lead decisionmakers to permit policy to be shaped solely by new
technology. The premises underlying the still vague notions of privacy
should be weighed against the justifications for increasing data collection
and disclosure accompanying the rise of databanks.
The appropriate means of controlling the operation of the NCIC is a
program of legislative and administrative safeguards. Not only are current
safeguards inadequate, but the broad range of controls necessary for an
effective program makes timely development of appropriate judicial doc-
trines unlikely. The recent announcement of legislative proposals for the
regulation of law enforcement databanks' 0 5 suggests that this problem
is beginning to receive the attention it deserves.
-Stuart R. Hemphill
105 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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